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Abstract: The extreme volatility of stock market values has been the subject of a large body 
of literature. Previous research focused on the short run because of a widespread belief that, 
in the long run, the market reverts to well understood fundamentals. Our work suggests this 
belief should be questioned as well. First, we show actual dividends cannot account for the 
secular trends of stock market values. We then consider a more comprehensive measure of 
capital income. This measure displays large secular fluctuations that roughly coincide with 
changes  in  stock  market  trends.  Under  perfect  foresight,  however,  this  measure  fails  to 
account  for  stock  market  movements  as  well.  We  thus  abandon  the  perfect  foresight 
assumption. Assuming instead that forecasts of future capital income are performed using a 
distributed lag equation and information available up to the forecasting period only, we find 
that  standard  asset  pricing  theory  can  be  reconciled  with  the  secular  trends  in  the  stock 
market. Nevertheless, our study leaves open an important puzzle for asset pricing theory: the 
market value of U.S. corporations was much lower than the replacement cost of corporate 
tangible assets from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. 
JEL codes: E25, G12. 
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Introduction 
Standard (consumption-based) asset pricing models have a hard time explaining high frequency fluctuations in 
stock market values, given observed fluctuations in fundamentals. The anomalies these models face have 
been labeled in a variety of ways - all ending with the word "puzzle" - and various solutions have been 
suggested,  none  of  which  seems  to  have  been  accepted  as  satisfactory  by  more  than  a  handful  of 
researchers. Campbell (2003) provides a summary of the various puzzles and solutions proposed by the 
consumption based asset pricing literature, while Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001) contains the solution 
that, so far, we find the least unconvincing. While the search continues, it becomes more and more apparent 
that the hope of capturing the stock market's short-run gyrations by appropriately filtering the quarterly 
movements  of  aggregate  consumption  is  most  unlikely  to  be  realized.  Which  begs  the  trillion-dollar 
question: if consumption-based models cannot do the job, what can? In this article we contribute our two 
cents to the collective effort of answering this most difficult question. 
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Before completely abandoning the standard model, we find useful to study a seemingly less challenging, but 
more fundamental question. Namely, can the standard (that is to say: net present value based) economic 
theory of asset pricing account for the very large low frequency fluctuations in the aggregate stock market 
valuation of U.S. corporations? In other words: if we abstract from short term movements and look only at 
the very long run trends - those persistent enough to last at least five, and generally more, years - is the 
standard model capable of correctly explaining/predicting those, to begin with? As far as we know the 
question  has  seldom,  if  ever,  been  addressed  in  a  systematic  form.  It  is  also  relevant  for  an  overall 
assessment of models of asset pricing because of the widespread belief that, while the standard model may 
miss a few short-term bumps, in the long run the market always reverts to well understood fundamentals. 
Our investigation suggests that this belief should be questioned as well. 
 
Our analysis is structured as follows. First, we document the secular trends in the value of U.S. corporations. 
Available  data  rules  out  the  possibility  that  fluctuations  in  market  value  might  have  been  caused  by 
fluctuations in corporate assets. Then, we study the implications of a fundamental asset pricing equation 
according to which asset prices equal the expected discounted present value of returns. As is common in the 
literature, to test the implications of the theory we employ aggregate data (either from publicly traded firms 
or from the overall corporate sector). First, we show that the standard approach of computing the present 
value, under perfect foresight, of actual stock market dividends or returns cannot go very far in accounting 
for the secular trends of the U.S. stock market.  Since dividend payments may respond to complicated 
corporate finance considerations, we then study whether movements in the whole of  shareholders’ income 
may do a better job in accounting for stock market trends, reaching again a negative answer. Finally, we 
drop the perfect foresight assumption and study the implications of assuming shareholder’s make forecasts 
based only on available information, and a distributed lag equation. As we show, this assumption together 
with the fundamental asset pricing equation can go a long way in accounting for the secular trends of the 
U.S. stock market.  
  
The Secular Trends of the Value of Corporate Capital  
The key features of the data are summarized in Figure 1 below. Our data appendix details the sources and 
methods employed to construct this and all other graphs included in this paper. To normalize for economic 
growth, we focus on the behavior of the market value of corporations as a ratio to corporate value added (or 
other measures of aggregate output, when appropriate); we refer to this ratio as "market ratio." The black 
line in this figure represents the behavior of the market ratio during the last fifty-five years, based on annual 
data. The red line captures the low frequency movements in the market ratio by means of the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) trend, as is standard in the literature and as we do for every other variable in this paper. 
Almost un-distinguishable patterns result when other reasonable long-run filters are used.  
  
 As  one  can  see,  after  two  decades  of  growth  the  market  ratio  declined  by  50%  during  1973-74  and 
stagnated until the mid 1980s. From 1985 to 2000 it more than tripled, only to collapse again by 2001. Since 
then, the market ratio has fluctuated around 2.7, taking a gigantic drop (only partially reported in the figure, 
and now partially recovered) during recent months. These are large, in fact extremely large movements, by 
any metric; they are so large to dwarf the, also substantial, oscillations observable at the quarterly to yearly 
frequencies. The question is: what kind of economic rational drives such impressive swings? 
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Figure 1: Market Value to Corporate GDP. 
    
   
 
 
The most elementary model we can think of is one of aggregate production and capital accumulation over 
time. This type of models consider an aggregate firm producing national consumption (in fact, GNP) by 
employing capital,  , and labor,  , under a constant returns to scale production function,  The 
resource and wealth constraints for this economy are 
. 
Observe  that  in  this  environment  consumption  and  investment  (and  therefore  capital)  are 
interchangeable on a one-to-one basis. Hence, the price (or value) of the capital stock, measured in units of 
the consumption good, is always one. It follows that the market ratio must equal the physical capital/output 
ratio  implied  by  the  aggregate  production  function  .  This  most  elementary  explanation  is 
immediately ruled out by the data. In Figure 2, below, we super-impose the ratio of the replacement value of 
corporate capital to corporate GDP (that is to say,  ) to our market ratio. The former shows a 
remarkable stability compared to the latter: while some long run oscillations are visible they are of about one 
order of magnitude smaller than those of the market ratio, and they go the opposite direction. In summary: 
an explanation for the huge swings in the market ratio needs to be found somewhere else from the actual 
stock of capital owned by US corporations, or the cost of producing such equipment.
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Figure 2: Replacement Value of Corporate Capital and Market Value of Corporations to Corporate GDP. 
 
 
Perfect Foresight of Future Dividends. 
 
If oscillations in the market value of capital cannot be explained in terms of either its cost nor its quantity 
(relative  to  labor  and/or  output),  maybe  they  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  “value”:  the  market  ratio 
increases/decreases because the capital stock used by corporations becomes less/more productive, hence 
yielding more/less profits to its owners. According to this principle, the market value of corporate capital is 
determined  by  looking  forward  and  not  backward:  independently  of  how  capital  intensive  production 
processes may be, and the cost of installed machines, the market value will raise if capital is productive and 
its owners expect it to yield lots of profits, and it will go down in the opposite case. In summary: standard 
asset pricing theory says that the market ratio is a forecast. The questions are: (1) of what, and, (2) how 




and the market ratio equals  
                                                                                           
                                                               (2) 
Hence, either "biased" technological change or changes in sectoral factor intensities could bring about a change in the 
relative price of capital. Moreover, the market ratio may move around because the capital intensity of aggregate production moves 
around, or because the relative price of constructions and equipments oscillates. Notice, however, that the market ratio predicted 
by the model, expression (2), should still correspond to the capital output ratio of the U.S. (just as the simpler one-sector model).  
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  To begin answering them, we establish the simplest possible framework of analysis in which the 
value of corporations is equal to the value of what their capital will produce, and earn. We contemplate 
dynamic stochastic economies that are, on a period-by-period basis, subject to a vector of exogenously given 
shocks. Such shocks - that may include changes in productivity, demand, taxes and others - are the source of 
uncertainty through which the forward looking agents must peruse in order to price assets on the basis of 
their expected future returns. Let   be the expectation operator, taken with respect to the probability 
distribution  capturing  the  uncertainty  relative  to  the  future  value  of  the  shocks  on  the  basis  of  the 
information  available  at  time  ;  dt   are  the  dividends  paid  by  the  firm  to  shareholders, 
the dividends and capital gains income tax rates and Vt  the market value of the firm, all as of 
period   Finally, let  pt+i  be the stochastic discount factor of future consumption, i.e. the value today of 
one unit of consumption obtained, in some state of the world, during the future period  t + i,i =1,2,3,.... 
The following relation holds 
       
Vt = (1− τt




















⎦⎥,              (1) 
for T some arbitrary positive number, or plus infinity. This formula states that the market value of a firm 
should equal the expected present discounted value of the future stream of (after tax) shareholder's income 
it generates plus the (after-tax) capital gains/losses that result from selling the share at some future period. 
 
It  is  important  to  remark  the  fundamental  asset  pricing  equation  (1)  holds  in  a  wide  range  of 
economic  models.  Indeed,  different  branches  of  the  literature  have  emerged  from  varying  the  key 
assumptions and methods for deriving predictions from this equation. The consumption-based asset pricing 
literature,  for  instance,  assumes  dividends  and  consumption  are  exogenously  given  processes.  In  this 
literature, the interaction of the stochastic discount factor and the dividend process are the key forces 
driving the volatility of asset prices. The production based asset-pricing literature, in turn, develops the asset 
pricing implications of models where consumption and dividends are endogenously determined. Finally, the 
present value pricing literature considers long holding periods for shares (high values for T, in our notation), 
and explores the asset pricing implications of alternative measurements for dividends and long-run discount 
factors.   
To derive the exact quantitative implications of the asset pricing equation (1) one would need to 
measure all of the possible time series of taxes, discount factors, capital income, and, in particular, the 
probabilities the market assigns to all possible future states of the world. Determining the latter directly, at 
any given point in time, is an impossible task because the theory, per se, admits the most arbitrary set of 
expectations  for  the  participating  agents.  A  common  benchmark  followed  in  the  literature  (e.g.  Shiller 
(2005))  consists  of  assuming  a  constant  discount  factor,  and  approximating  capital  income  by  actual 
dividends. Crucially, perfect foresight on dividends is commonly assumed as well: the market prices are 
supposed to be based on exact forecasts of the realized dividends, hence realized dividends can be used in 
the computations. Because these are open-ended models, existing analyses typically complement the perfect 
foresight hypothesis with the additional assumption that dividends will grow at some average rate for the 
infinite future. Generally, this literature also abstracts away from fluctuations in the tax on dividend income.  
This approach does not go very far in accounting for equity price movements. A representative 
illustration  of  the  predictions  from  the  theory  under  the  aforementioned  assumptions,  based  on  the 
dividend data compiled by Shiller (2005), is presented in Figure 3 below. For comparison purposes, the 
ratios displayed below have been normalized so that their 1960-72 average is equal to one (we will follow 
this normalization procedure throughout this paper). These computations assume a 7% discount rate, and a 
terminal growth rate for dividends of 3% for the infinite future following period t.  We use a constant   6 
discount rate to simplify our presentation, but our results do not change much if one employs instead a 
discount rate based on a power function of consumption growth, as is standard in consumption based asset 
pricing theory. Our assumption of 3% terminal growth for dividends is also incorrect since the dividend to 
GDP ratio has been decreasing over time, while GDP has been growing at an average of about 3% for most 
of the period (see Figure 8 below). The perfect foresight assumption implies that the market ratio should 
have been very high earlier on - as dividends were a high percentage of corporate GDP in the 1950s, and 
discounting matters - to subsequently decrease, and remain quite stable, as dividend's growth rates stabilized 
from the middle 1970s onward. This makes the large oscillations that took place between 1970 and today 
impossible to explain on the basis of dividend payoffs, perfect foresight and a stable dividends to GDP 
ratio. Our first conclusion is that one, or more, of these three assumptions – dividends are the payoff to be 




Figure 3: Perfect-foresight Present Value of Dividends, Capital at Replacement Cost, and Market Value of 
U.S. Corporations (as ratios to Corporate GDP). 
 
The fact that equity prices increased so rapidly during the late 1990s and that the value of dividends 
did not has been interpreted by some as evidence of irrational exuberance. This is not necessarily correct: 
there may have been "exuberance", but it needs not be "irrational" insofar as the information available to 
the market did not have to be sufficient to compute correctly the future evolution of dividends. We will 
return to this point later, as the issue of what the market can and cannot "forecast correctly" is at the root of 
the problem we are addressing. In any case, an “irrational bubble” might have been partially behind equity 
prices during the mid 1990s, but notice that even after both the 2000 and the recent stock market crashes, 
the  market  ratio  is  much  higher  than  during  the  1980s:  what  is  it  that  the  market  ratio  is  therefore 
"forecasting"? Similarly, the issue of why equity prices were so low in the early 1950s or in the mid 1970s 
and 1980s, is not frequently addressed in the financial literature either, which begs, again a similar question: 
what was the market ratio "forecasting" during those periods? Not dividends - or, at least, not correctly -   7 
because the net present value of actual future dividends is above the market ratio between the early 1970s 
and the early 1990s.  
As we will argue later on, the low market valuations in the middle period appear to be the hardest to 
understand. Notice in passing that this hypothetical market ratio, computed only on the basis of observed 
dividends is much closer to the replacement value of capital than the actual market ratio. In other words, if 
the stock market had really valued corporations on the basis of actually realized dividends, the market and 
replacement values of corporate capital would have been relatively close during the 56 years we study, and 
the only long-run puzzle would be a persistent difference, in levels, between the replacement cost of capital 
and the present value of the dividends it has been generating. Such a puzzle could be easily solved, though, 
by lowering the discount rate below the 7% value we used in the reported calculation. But, apparently, this is 
not what the stock market did. 
Let us move a bit forward and refine this "perfect foresight" methodology by modifying the object 
supposedly forecasted by the market ratio. First off, McGrattan and Prescott (2005) document important 
changes in the taxation of dividend income and investment subsidies that may account for some of the 
observed fluctuations in equity values. We therefore recompute the implications of the theory by adjusting 
for the varying rate of dividend's taxation. The results are in Figure 5, and they are not good. Which leads us 
to repeat the observation made earlier on: the perfect foresight assumption, when applied to the valuation of 
future  payment's  streams,  imposes  strong  restrictions  on  the  model's  predictions.  In  particular,  by 
eliminating any learning process and assuming the market "knows" future events much earlier than they 
materialize,  it  tends  to  "front  load"  all  historical  changes,  producing  (thanks  to  discounting)  very  flat 
predictions. In summary: if agents can more or less perfectly forecast all relevant variables, the long run 
swings of the market ratio make no sense whatsoever. This suggests that the problem may not be with 
"what" the market forecasts but with "how" it does it.  
 
Figure 5: Perfect-foresight Present value of Dividends (before and after dividend taxes) to Corporate GDP 
vs. Data. 
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It may be possible to offer arguments in favor of the perfect foresight assumption for economic 
fundamentals (like dividends and discount factors). Assuming perfect foresight in policy variables such as 
taxes  seems  much  harder  to  do.  Indeed,  McGrattan  and  Prescott's  analysis  studies  the  impact  of  an 
unexpected and permanent change in taxes. Following this idea, we recompute the predictions for the 
theory under the assumption of perfect foresight on dividends and interest rates, but assuming that, at each 
period, a new tax rate arrives, unexpectedly, and this rate is believed to persist into the infinite future. As 
first noted by Bian (2007), this type of changes in dividend income taxes can (very) partially account for the 
higher values of the market ratio from 1994 to 2008. However, in this case, the size of the increase is too 
small and its timing is way off. Figure 6 suggests that the stock market undervalued corporations between 
1952 and 1961 and then, again, between 1970 and 1992, while some kind of "exuberance" (irrational or not, 
we will see) has driven the market ratio from about 1996 to the present. In plain words: even after allowing 
for large tax surprises, the net present value of future dividends provides us with a very poor explanation of 
what happened to the market ratio. 
 
Figure 6: Perfect-foresight Present Value of Dividends (before and after (unexpected changes in) taxes) to 
Corporate GDP vs. Data. 
Symmetry would require assuming that a new (permanent) growth rate for dividends also arrives, 
unexpectedly, at each period. Under these conditions, namely a random walk growth rate for dividends, g, 
and a constant discount factor, r, the asset pricing equation will simply predict that the market ratio moves 
proportionally with the dividend growth rate. In fact, the random walk hypothesis implies that the market 
value should equal today’s (after tax) dividends divided by rt − gt . Figure 7 below reports the growth rate of 
real dividends and averages (of different lengths) of past growth rates. Notice, first, that the growth rate of 
dividends  is  fairly  volatile.  Second,  up  to  the  mid  1980s,  changes  in  the dividend  growth rate roughly 
coincide with changes in the trend of the market ratio. The growth rate of dividends goes down around   9 
1968, and so does the market ratio. Similarly, dividend growth is low through the mid 1970s and it does not 
recover until the mid 1980s. The market ratio follows similar patterns. Dividend growth does not have any 
specific trend, on average, during 1992-2008, but it displays higher volatility. While the big increases in the 
market ratio of the mid 1990s and later are hard to be accounted for by trends in dividend growth, it is 
surprising  how  well  the  five  and  ten  year  averages  of  the  dividends’  growth  rate  mimic  the  long  run 
gyrations of the market ratio. 
 
Figure 7: Growth Rate of Dividends (Actual and Averages of Past years) 
 
It is important to stress that, in spite of the fact that changes in the (average trend of the) dividend 
growth rate are positively related to changes in the trend of the market ratio, the growth rates of actual 
dividends are very often negative. Of course, assuming that dividends will grow at a negative rate for the 
infinite future is not very realistic, which makes us return to our fundamental question. If it is not a forecast 
of actual dividends paid, then the market ratio is a forecast of what? The sections that follow refine the 
production-based asset-pricing model to provide one possible answer to this question. 
 
Perfect Foresight of Total Capital Income 
 
     Actual  dividends  paid,  in  light  of  our  previous  analysis,  cannot  help  understanding  any  of  the  big 
historical swings in the market ratio. It is not clear, however, that one should use actual dividends in testing 
the  theory.  In  particular,  actual  dividend  payments  may  respond  to  additional  considerations  such  as 
informational  asymmetries,  principal-agent  revelation  mechanisms,  fiscal  incentives  other  than  those 
captured by the taxation of dividends and capital gains, and so on and so forth (Easterbrook (1984), and 
Feldstein and Green (1983) review some of the relevant literature). In trying to determine how far the 
fundamental asset pricing equation (1) can take us, it seems more appropriate to abstract from dividend   10 
payment considerations and start instead from a simple framework whereby firms' net worth equals the 
present value of all shareholders’ income.  
The earlier model of production can be adapted to this end by assuming that the aggregate firm chooses 
capital,  labor  and  investment  in  order  to  maximize  the  net  present  value  of  shareholders'  income. 
Shareholders' income is endogenously determined by the interaction between firm's investment choices and 
the households' optimal holdings of shares of ownership of the firm. According to this model, shareholders 
are the residual claimants of corporate value added after compensation of employees, corporate income 
taxes, and gross investment are taken care of. The equation determining the fraction of value added (that we 
keep calling d t ) accruing to shareholders in period   now is 
 
where wt  is the wage rate and “taxes” includes all kind of taxes falling upon the shareholders of the firm as 
such. 
What are the asset pricing implications of this type of model? First, the fundamental equation (1) is 
still valid. However, we now have a definition for capital income, consistent with a specific theory, which 
can be easily mapped into the U.S. NIPA data.
4 The second prediction of the model is, as before, the 
familiar identity of market value and the value of all of the firm's assets (capital stock), after adjusting for 
dividend income taxes.  
       
Vt = (1− τt






This  makes  it  clear  that  shareholders  may  obtain  income  from  ownership  of  the  firm  in  two 
different ways. The first is the present value of dividend payments, which is what the firm supposedly 
maximizes and that accrues to owners holding shares in perpetuity. The second way to obtain income is by 
selling equity shares, which may result in capital gains (or losses). Notice, finally, that standard measures of 
capital income equal shareholder's income plus investment expenditures. This is consistent with our model. 
Investment  expenditures  are  indeed  a  form  of  capital  income  since  they  may  ultimately  affect  future 
dividends and the future value of the firm, which are both taken into account by the asset pricing equation 
above. To put it differently: shareholders total income in period t is the sum of the dividends received and 
of the (potential) capital gains accrued; the latter include (among other things) the value of period's t gross 
investment. 
Since shareholder's income is, by an accounting identity, equal to the fraction of corporate valued 
added accruing to shareholders multiplies by corporate GDP, it is worth considering the two components 
separately to see if their movements over time teach us anything useful. In standard macroeconomic models 
attention is focused, more often than not, on the time series behavior of corporate GDP, while the share 
accruing to the owners of capital is taken as constant and paid very little attention to. This analytical choice 
is unfortunate since, as we will show later on, it may lead one to miss a fundamental factor affecting 
movements in stock market evaluations. Figures 8 and 9 below report the two components separately. 
Notice that this is corporate GDP data, and thus it does not include the impact of changes in personal taxes 
in the net income accruing to shareholders. 
 
                                                             
4 Company originated quarterly earnings are more comprehensive measures of capital income than dividends. However, we find 
that the results we report, when based on earnings, are very similar to those based on actual dividends.         
 
Figure 8: Growth of Corporate GDP.
 
 
Figure 9: Share of Corporate Output Accruing to Capital Owners to Corp. GDP.
 
There are various salient features in these data. First, corporate GDP growth fluctuates widely 
around an otherwise apparently stable long run growth rate (with, possibly, a very modest downward trend 
in the latter period) and there are, really, only two decades of "major" (i.e. above average) growth: the 1960s 
and the 1990s. Because these are also the two periods in which the market ratio rallied the most , one would   12 
be lead to say that “roughly” the stock market captured the underlying long-run oscillations in payoff. The 
key word here, though, is “roughly”; in fact, very roughly as the subsequent quantitative analysis will show. 
Further, the recovery that ended almost two years ago was nothing spectacular: in terms of total corporate 
GDP growth it was the worst expansion of the last fifty years!  
Second, shareholders income as a fraction of total corporate value added fluctuates widely over the 
sample period and has gone through the roof during the last decade. The shareholders share of corporate 
GDP increased by 50% between 1953 and 1965, to then go down by 40% between 1966 and 1971, and 
remain at that level up to the early 1980s. The period 1982-1986 implies a doubling of the capital income 
share, followed by a relative stabilization up to 2001, when the share increases sharply to unprecedented 
levels. By 2007 the capital income share is 40% higher than its 1983-2001 average and more than double 
what it was during the late 1960s and the 1970s. So much for the widespread assumption of long run 
constancy of the capital share. Notice also that the long run fluctuations we evidence by means of the HP 
filter are dwarfed by the fluctuations taking place at business cycle frequencies: factors' shares in corporate 
income are anything but stable over time. 
As a matter of fact, fluctuations in capital income are so large (particularly, the 1982 - 2007 increase 
is so dramatic) that it becomes meaningless to perform a perfect foresight experiment symmetric to the ones 
above using the historically realized average growth rate of the capital share as the out of sample predictor 
for future dividends' growth. Because of the very large growth in the share of value added going to capital, 
the average growth rate of corporate capital income during the last twenty-five years is close to 6%, while 
corporate GDP grew on average at 3%. Assuming a permanent growth of 6% for corporate capital income 
implies that its share of corporate value added would become 100% a few decades in the future, which 
clearly makes no sense. A more reasonable experiment would then be to assume that, in the future, the 
capital share would remain constant at its average level during, say, the last ten years, while corporate GDP 
grows into the infinite future at some reasonable rate. This is what we do, assuming that the capital share 
will remain at its average of the period 1998-2008, and, for consistency with our previous analysis, assuming 
that the current dividend tax will persist into the infinite future. The results are summarized in Figure 10 
below.  Interesting  enough,  this  reasonable  modification  does  not  make  much  of  a  difference  and  the 
simulated market ratio resembles that of Figure 6.   13 
 
Figure 10: Perfect-foresight Present Value of Capital Income (before and after unexpected changes in taxes) 
to Corporate GDP vs. Data. 
 
It is also instructive to consider what the second equality implied by the theory, and by common 
sense,  suggests:  in  normal  circumstances  the  market  value  of  corporations  should  be  equal  to  the 
replacement cost of the installed capital stock PLUS whatever organizational and intangible capital (e.g., 
patents, industrial secrets, and so on) the corporations control. In principle, at least, a corporation should be 
able to sell its constructions and equipment on the market at roughly their replacement cost: hence its 
market valuation should be lower than that only in those special circumstances in which constructions and 
equipment had been poorly invested and cannot be re-directed to a different productive activity. While, at 
the level of individual firms, this happens all the times one does not expect this to happen for roughly 32 
out of 56 years for the whole corporate sector, which is, instead, what the data we have been considering 
suggests happened!  
Specifically, the time series evolution of the K/Y ratio (at replacement value) as reported by NIPA, 
and summarized in Figure 2, moves a lot less than, and it seems to be strongly negatively correlated with, the 
market ratio. We observe very high investment levels (hence, of the capital stock in relation to output) in the 
mid 1970s, while equity values are persistently low. When the stock market trend inverts, so do investment 
and the K/Y ratio; hence low investment in the 1980s, with high equity values. To put it differently: until 
about 1987, whenever an American firm purchased a piece of capital and installed it in one of its buildings, 
that piece of capital immediately lost some value according to stock market's prices. The common sense 
interpretation of this fact is that, for more than 30 years, the stock market considered the investment 
decisions of US corporations to be "value reducing"! We call this a “puzzle” and, unless one is willing to 
theorize that “negative organizational capital” was accumulated for three decades, this puzzle dwarfs the 
many other ones.  
A recent literature offers an alternative interpretation of the previous facts. High investments take 
place when new and profitable technologies are first discovered, or adopted due to changes in the economic 
environment,  and  profits  come  in  later,  when  those  technologies  become  fully  operational  and  start   14 
producing their fruits. Moreover, the fact that new technologies and new capital are introduced may render 
old capital obsolete, causing the market value of the latter to collapse [cf. Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001), or 
Peralta-Alva (2007)]. In this sense, one is tempted to read the high profits post 1982 as the return on the 
high investments of the 1970s. While this interpretation is perfectly reasonable and it makes historical sense, 
it does requires us to throw away a major tenet of most standard models, i.e. that stock market's prices 
embed  an  unbiased  forecast  of  future  corporate  performances.  If  valuable,  and  ultimately  successful, 
investments were taking place in the 1970s and early 1980s, the depressed stock market's prices of that 
decade did not manage to incorporate such payoffs, which could not, therefore, be conceived as "expected". 
They happened, but the shareholders financing the high investment levels of those years were apparently 
unable to foresee the future gains those investments would have brought to them. This is puzzling.  
During those years, instead, the share of capital in corporate income was at historical lows (Figure 
11) and the market ratio seemed to, myopically, reflect more current miseries than future successes. The fact 
that it is hard to reconcile these observations with the theory is also emphasized by the technological 
change-driven explanations for the trends in the market ratio quoted above, since in those models the 
market ratio tends to recover way earlier than in the data. Notice that it is only after the middle 1980s, when 
the successes have been coming for a while and the capital share of corporate income has started to rise 
steadily, that the market ratio also picks up and starts reflecting current successes or, maybe, forecasting 
future ones.  A similar point can be made for pretty much every single major swing of the data we are 
considering: oscillations in the market ratio are anticipated by oscillations in the share of capital income in corporate GDP 
instead of predicting them. This observation suggests looking more carefully into the way in which shareholders 
forecast future performances and, in particular, into the role that current movements in the share of capital 
income play in determining shareholders' optimism or pessimism vis-à-vis the future. 
 
 
Figure 11: Shareholder's share of corporate GDP vs. Market ratio. 
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Building on the lessons from Standard Models 
 
The main conclusions we derive from our previous analysis are as follows. First, actual dividends 
paid are too smooth to account for the key low frequency trends in the market ratio; this remains true also 
when unexpected changes in the fiscal regime are taken into consideration. However, actual dividends paid 
are  not  necessarily  what  is  priced  by  the  stock  market:  while  dividends  paid  are  stable  over  time,  we 
documented  that  the  fraction  of  corporate  value  added  captured  by  shareholders  displays  important 
fluctuations. In spite of this adjustment, the asset valuation equation implied by different models under the 
perfect foresight hypothesis and a constant interest rate predicts a market ratio that is still too smooth 
relative to the data. Furthermore, we find that large classes of asset pricing models where dividends are 
endogenously determined have some predictions that are hard to reconcile with the data. In particular, these 
models predict market value should equal the value of the assets of the firm (after adjusting for taxes) while 
in the data these two series are negatively correlated, with, most of the times, the market value of the firm 
lower  than  the  value  of  the  physical  assets  the  firm  controls!  Finally,  eyeball  analysis  suggests  that 
movements  in  the  share  of  capital  in  corporate  income  may  be  a  rough  but  consistent  predictors  of 
movements in the market ratio, an empirical regularity we now try to exploit. 
 
A delicate issue with all of our previous computations is the following: pretending that in 1950 or in 
1960, or even 1992 for that matter, shareholders could exactly forecast dividend payments in 2007 is clearly 
absurd. More important, the perfect foresight assumption typically results in a smooth series of predicted 
market values since all future fluctuations are foreseen and capitalized from the very beginning. Hence, a 
more reasonable "expectations formation" hypothesis needs to be introduced. While doing this opens a 
bottomless can of worms, this is an issue one must face squarely, especially if the study of past stock 
market's  behavior  is  supposed  to  shed  some  light  on  its  current  performances:  what  on  earth  drives 
shareholders' expectations? We consider this issue next. 
In the old days people talked of "extrapolative expectations" arguing that - when forecasting the 
future in the absence of an understanding of the structural model driving the system - we look at trends in 
past data and extrapolate those trends over the relevant horizon. This happens, though, only when we have 
become convinced that they are, indeed, permanent trends and not just small and irrelevant blips. When 
evidence suggests that the trend has changed or reverted back to old patterns, we accept it only after a while 
but, once accepted, we tend to extrapolate it into the indefinite future. The problem, obviously, is how long 
is the "while" and how reasonable it is to assume that people extrapolate trends that cannot be sustained 
forever, such as the one we just noted to exist in the capital share of corporate value added during the last 
two decades. This is a hard question for which we do not have a good answer and that the learning literature 
has really never addressed. We will try, nevertheless, to make some practical progresses along these lines. 
We start by assuming that people extrapolate past trends forward, altering it as soon as "enough" 
evidence is obtained that the previous trend is no longer likely to persist. Following this idea, suppose agents 
use all the information available up to T periods in the past. We generate separate "forecasts" for the growth 
rate of corporate GDP and for the capital income share, using a weighted average on the observations for 
the last N <T periods. We focus, as before, on the classical trading strategy where infinitely long series of 
shareholder's income are generated and used to predict market value. We compute "forecasts" based on the 
distributed lag equation 
 
where X is the growth rate of each variable under consideration (in this case, the capital income share, 
corporate GDP growth rate, and dividend income tax rates).   16 
We assume, as in our previous quantitative experiments, a constant discount factor of 7% and 
employ the maximum number of lags possible at each moment in time (given our data set). We then 
estimate the weights (one lambda for each time series being forecasted) in the distributed lag equation such 
that the sum of squared deviations between the theoretical market ratio and the data was minimized (further 
details can be found in our appendix).  The model's predictions and the data are summarized in Figure 12 
below. As we can see, this simple approach can deliver a substantial improvement over the perfect foresight 
framework considered before. In particular, the predicted magnitudes for the 1960-68 increase, the mid 
1970s  decline  and  stagnation  that  followed,  and  the  ultimate  recovery  of  market  valuations,  are  all 
comparable to those in the data. Notice, however, that the timing of the predicted changes in the trend of 
the market ratio tend to be off by a few years, and that we cannot account for the large drop in market value 
of recent years either.  Nevertheless, given the simplicity of our approach, we consider the predictions 
obtained by using this ad-hoc form of extrapolative expectations interesting and worthy of being pursued 
more systematically. 
 
Figure 12: Present Value of Model Consistent Dividends vs. Data.  
 
Barsky  and  De  Long  (1993)  follow  a  similar  approach  and  conclude  that  dividend  movements 
roughly  account  for  the  secular  fluctuations  in  the  U.S.  stock  market  from  the  1800's  to  1993.  These 
authors, however, abstract from changes in taxes, and use actual dividends paid by stock market firms in 
their analysis. As we illustrate above, however, actual dividends paid cannot account for the high stock 
market values observed after 1993. More important, these authors employ a distributed lag equation similar 
to ours and estimate, period by period, a permanent growth rate of dividends. Such estimation process implies 
(when applied to the actual data) that agents must expect dividends to grow at a rate permanently higher, or 
lower, than corporate GDP, which cannot really happen. The Barsky and De Long’s paper uses data up to 
the very early 1990s, hence does not have to face this puzzling prediction of their methodology, which is   17 
instead an implication of the last two decades of data. Furthermore, our quantitative analysis above has 
documented that, once one constrains the long-run growth rate of dividends to equal that of corporate 
GDP, it becomes impossible to account for observed stock market fluctuations. Our results in Figure 12 are 
computed based on forecasts of the HP-trend of the growth rate of corporate GDP and, although this 
growth rate is far less volatile than dividends, may thus be subject to a similar criticism. To determine 
whether our results are driven by potentially unrealistic, permanent, forecasted values for the growth rate of 
corporate GDP, we consider a new experiment where a constant 3% growth rate for corporate GDP is 





Figure 13: Present Value of Model Consistent Shareholder's Income vs. Data (Assuming constant Corp. 
GDP growth). 
 
The fit of the model is still surprisingly good until a year ago: the drop in market ratio of the last year 
was unpredictable on the basis of the dividends performances observable up to 2007. It remains an open 
question to check what this methodology would predict a couple of years from now, when the substantial 
drop  in  capital  income  that  took  place  in  2008  and  2009  will  be  reported  in  the  data.  This  caveat 
notwithstanding, though, Figure 13 suggests that fluctuations in model consistent shareholders income, and 
in taxes, can account for a large part of the secular movements of the U.S. stock market during the last 56 
years  IF  one  is  willing  to  assume  that  market  participants  use  something  akin  to  the  distributed  lags 
forecasting equation above in forming their expectations about the future. The key challenge for this simple 
framework seems to be accounting for the timing of the recovery during the mid 1980s and early 1990s. 
Capital income increased dramatically in the early 1980s. Dividend taxes declined substantially during the 
mid 1980s as well. According to the theory, these changes should have translated in a strong stock market 
recovery at the time. In the data, the recovery did start in the mid 1980s, but most of it did not take place 
until the mid 1990s.   18 
Up to now, we have evaluated the asset pricing equation of the basic model under a trading strategy 
of buy and hold (forever). Notice, however, that this fundamental asset pricing equation holds for buy and 
hold, but it also implies that the value of the firm must equal the value of holding shares for any number of 
periods, T, and then selling and capturing the corresponding capital gains (or losses). Unfortunately, our 
current framework of analysis is not suited for studying the implications of the theory for short-term trading 
strategies. To understand why, observe that such analysis would require forecasting model consistent capital 
income (as before) as well as future market values. But model consistent capital income is a relatively small 
fraction of corporate GDP (between 6% and 10%), while market value is almost ten times larger, between 
50% and 160% of corporate GDP. Hence, for relatively short holding periods, fluctuations in the value of 
corporations  predicted  by  the  theory  will  be  mostly  driven  by  fluctuations  in  predicted  market  values. 
Indeed, when we apply the previous methods to derive the predictions of the asset pricing equation for 
holding periods between 3 and 5 years we obtain a very good fit not only for the HP trend of the market 
ratio, but for the actual market ratio (Figure 14). The fact that the model matches well the HP trend of the 
market ratio, however, follows immediately from the fact that the HP-trend of the market value (which is 
the focus of our analysis) is very persistent and predictable.  To compute the predictions of the theory for 
period t’s market value, we assume agents use all information available up to when the forecast is made, 
compute  a  new  HP-trend  for  market  value,  and  use  such  market  value  trend  to  forecast  (using  the 
distributed lag equation above) future market values (and thus capital gains). Since an HP-trend series that is 
updated  continuously  provides  a  good  approximation  (with  a  lag)  to  the  underlying  time  series,  our 
estimation method approximates well the actual market ratio (with a lag).  
 
 








We study fluctuations in the long run trend of the ratio between stock market value and GDP for 
the U.S. corporate sector. According to economic theory, the market value of U. S. corporations should 
equal the expected present discounted value of the future flow of income and capital gains generated by this 
sector. This prediction of the theory is frequently tested assuming perfect foresight on actual dividends paid. 
Actual dividends are very smooth and their movements cannot account for stock market trends, even in the 
long  run.  Many  researchers  consider  this  a  puzzle.  We  find  that  a  measure  of model  consistent dividends 
fluctuates  much  more  than  actual  dividends  paid.  More  important,  fluctuations  in  model  consistent 
dividends are positively correlated with stock market fluctuations. We illustrate that the perfect foresight 
assumption, by construction, predicts a very smooth present value of model consistent dividends, and thus a 
very smooth market ratio, even when dividends fluctuate a lot. Theory does not require nor does it imply 
that individuals and firms have perfect foresight, however; it simply requires and predicts that individuals 
will use all available information optimally (that is: as well as they can) to form their expectations of future 
movements in capital income. We then evaluate the theory under the assumption that all available (but no 
future) information is used in an extrapolative expectations format to forecast future dividend payments. We 
employ a distributed lag equation to do so. We find that the present value of dividends, computed in this 
way, is much more consistent with the data. Apart from the obvious question of what, other than wisdom 
after the fact, may justify or explain the particular choice of forecasting rule made by market participants, 
our analysis leaves open an important puzzle: the value of corporations should equal the value of their 
tangible  and  intangible  assets,  while  in  the  data  the  two  series  seem  to  be  negatively  correlated  and 
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I. Data Appendix 
a. Data 
The market value of corporations is based on the Quarterly level Data from Flows of Funds Account of the United States 
called “Issues at Market Value” in Table L.213.  We take the end-of-year period of the quarterly frequency market 
value to create the annual level data for market value. 
Corporate value added (or Corporate GDP) is the Gross Value Added of Corporate Business from the National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA), published by Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Table 1.14. Data on corporate 
businesses is obtained from National Income and Product Account (NIPA).  
The replacement value of corporate capital is the sum of non-residential and residential tangible corporate fixed assets, 
measured at current cost, as reported in the Standard Fixed Asset Tables of the BEA (Tables 4.1 and 5.1). 
Dividend tax rates up to 1998 are taken from the data appendix of McGrattan and Prescott (2005), the rate from 1999-
2005 was taken from Bian (2007) Ph. D. dissertation (University of Miami), who followed the methodology of 
McGrattan and Prescott. The rate for years 2006-2008 was assumed equal to that of year 2005. 
Both, compensation of employees and corporate income taxes were taken from Table 1.14 of the U.S. NIPA, Gross Value 
Added of Domestic Corporate Business. Compensation of employees is line 4, while taxes are the sum of corporate 
income taxes (line 12) and Taxes on production and import less subsidies (line 7). Corporate gross investment is from the 
Fixed Asset Tables, and it is equal to the sum of Investment in Private Nonresidential and Residential Fixed Assets of 
U.S. corporations (Tables 4.7 and 5.7).  
b. Transformations on the Data 
Except for tax rates, we divide all the series by Implicit Price Deflator (2000=100) before we begin our analysis.  In 
the annual series that we apply HP trend on, we use a smoothing parameter of 6.25, recommended by Ravn and Uhlig 
(2002).  To estimate figure 14, we use HP trend of market value at the quarterly level.  In that case, we use a 
smoothing parameter of 1600. 
 
II. Computational Appendix. 
This section describes the algorithm employed to compute the market value forecasts summarized in Figures 12 and 
13.   21 
We start by constructing forecasts for corporate GDP growth, the share of dividends in corporate GDP, and dividend 
tax rates. These forecasts are based on a distributed lag equation. In particular, standing at period t, we compute the 










Here,  λX denotes  the  weight  of  past  observations,  and  N  the  number  of  lags  included  in  the  forecast.  Let 
 (g 
t+k|t,τ 
d,t+k|t,s d,t+k|t) denote the resulting period t forecasted sequences for the growth rate of corporate GDP, the 
tax rate on dividend income taxes, and the dividend share of corporate GDP. 
Then, our forecast at period t for dividends at t+k is given by: 
 
 dt+k|t = (1−  τd,t+k|t) sd,t+k|tGDPcorpHP−trend,t (1+ g 
t+k|t)
k ∏ . 
It is important to stress that we compute the predictions of the model using only information available up to the 
period when the forecast is made. This entails computing a new set of HP trends from the data, as well new out of 
sample forecasted sequences for dividends, GDP growth, and taxes at each given year.  









Finally, the values of the weights in the distributed lag equations above,  , where chosen so as to 
minimize the square sum of residuals between forecasted and observed market values (as ratios to corporate GDP). 
The values we employed are  λd = 0.65,λτd = 0.79 ( ).  
The results reported in Figure 13 are obtained following a symmetric procedure where we replace the last 




k ∏ , by (1+ 0.03)
k . 
 
 
 
 
 